


Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) User Guide



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COMBINED JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (CJEF) USER GUIDE



Director Concepts and Doctrine



Directeur du Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrines et
d'Expérimentations

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Foreword

The Lancaster House Treaty signed between the two heads of government in November 2010 represented a significant strengthening in the defence and security relationship between the UK and France. The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) is a flagship project within the agreement and will consist of national Force Elements operating side by side with the ability to respond to a wide range of scenarios, including high intensity operations.

This User Guide is designed for all personnel involved at the operational and higher tactical level of CJEF operations and has been jointly developed by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre at Shrivenham, and the Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrine et d'Expérimentations in Paris. It is a living document and, as we move towards the Final Validation of Concept in 2016 and the final stages of CJEF development, it will be revised to ensure that the principles contained reflect the reality of what we are trying to achieve. We consider the Guide an essential tool in the development of the CJEF concept, and expect it to be utilised as a key reference document for all involved in the CJEF project.



General Sir Nicholas Houghton
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

20 Nov 2012



Général d'Armée Pierre de Villiers
Major Général des Armées

20 Nov 2012

Preface

1. The UK/France Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty describes the political and strategic framework for a programme of cooperation across Defence. In February 2011, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) of the UK and the Chef d'Etat-major des Armées (CEMA) of the French Republic agreed to a *Joint Procedural Document* implementing the *Joint Letter of Intent* and a set of Common Objectives for 2011.¹ These included progress on the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), joint non-combatant evacuation operations planning, bilateral exercises, alignment of concepts and doctrine, as well as capability and equipment cooperation.²
2. On 10 June 2011, the UK's CDS and France's CEMA approved the military *Level of Ambition* setting out the size, nature and working mechanisms of the UK/French force. On 16 February 2012, CDS and CEMA approved the *Concept of Employment* that will be used as a framework for work on subordinate components as well as the guidelines for training and activity in support of the CJEF.
3. This CJEF User Guide will:
 - summarise the background to, and purpose of, the CJEF;
 - consider the UK and French strategic decision-making processes, identifying areas of commonality and difference, and summarising how political strategy reaches the CJEF as operational direction;
 - provide a ready reference to existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine which forms the basis for CJEF operations, as well as the authority for eventually developing the necessary CJEF headquarters handbooks and standard operating procedures;
 - address the guiding principles for command and control, communication and information systems, information sharing and logistics;

¹ British Chief of Defence Staff Common Objectives are renewed annually following the meeting of the Senior Level Group.

² UK and France Chiefs of Defence Staff Joint Annual Report dated 02 November 2011.

- summarise the operating concepts in the maritime, air and land environments; and
- incorporate the lessons learned from current and future operations.

4. The CJEF user guide has been developed to assist staff operating at the operational and higher tactical levels of CJEF operations. This will include staff of the operational and force headquarters, as well as defence staff. The guide has wider use as it also provides a framework for effective interaction with:

- host nation forces and institutions;
- international organisations;
- non-government organisations; and
- potential partner or contributing nations.

COMBINED JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (CJEF) USER GUIDE

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Chapter 1 – Creating the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force

Chapter 1 summarises the history, purpose and structure of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF).

Section 1 – History

101. **Background.** At the Lancaster House Summit on 02 November 2010, the UK and France took the historic decision to raise our defence and security cooperation to unprecedented levels. We are natural partners in security and defence, and our countries share values, global interests and responsibilities. We signed two treaties, one on security and defence cooperation, the other on joint defence nuclear capabilities. These were ratified by our two Parliaments. They now constitute the foundation of a wide range of ambitious cooperation programmes that are essential to our present and future defence and security interests.¹ The UK-France Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty came into force on 1 July 2011.

102. **The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force.** In November 2010, the UK and France agreed to develop a CJEF.² The level of ambition was agreed as an early entry force capable of facing multiple threats up to the highest intensity, available for bilateral, NATO, EU, UN or other operations.³ We will establish a deployable Combined UK/France Joint Force Headquarters which, by 2016, will use existing UK and French high readiness and experienced national force headquarters staff. This will include officers that we have embedded in each other's deployable headquarters. We will ensure that the CJEF Headquarters is capable of expansion to include staff from other nations participating in a multinational operation. We agreed to accelerate development of the command and control elements of the CJEF so that, in the short term, the combined CJEF Headquarters will be able to be deployed, on request, to command and execute an evacuation operation. This will be developed further to plan for, and be ready to execute, further operations of mutual interest before CJEF full operational capability in 2016.⁴

¹ Anglo-French Summit defence and security declaration, February 2012.

² Downing Street declaration by President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron dated 2 November 2010.

³ *CJEF Level of Ambition* document signed on 8 July 2011.

⁴ Chiefs of Defence Staff Joint Annual Report dated 2 November 2011.

Full operational capability will be achieved through a 5-year exercise framework, which commenced in 2011.

Section 2 – Purpose

103. **Capability.** The CJEF will be able to conduct offensive and defensive operations on land, in the air, and at sea, wherever UK and French national security interests are aligned. The total force in the 2016 timeframe will have a balanced range of capabilities which can be tailored to a mission. This will include a:

- scalable land component of at least a UK battlegroup and a French battlegroup;
- maritime component of up to a task group based on one or more capital ships;
- expeditionary air wing; and
- logistic component capable of supporting the totality of the CJEF deployment.

104. **Possible tasks.** The force should be rapidly deployable and, once ready in theatre, should be sustainable for up to three months of operations as a stand-alone force. Its operations should be able to include other coalition partners. The following tasks are considered the most likely for the CJEF:

- crisis management, involving early entry into a potentially hostile territory (including the initial enforcement of no-fly zones, embargoes and sanctions);
- protection of shared national interests abroad;
- extraction operations;⁵
- non-combatant evacuation operations;
- temporary strengthening of a peacekeeping operation; and
- support to emergency humanitarian assistance.

⁵ Extraction of forces as defined in AJP 3.4(A) *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations* dated October 2010 para 0307 (as opposed to search and rescue). AAP-6 defines extraction as *the removal of forces from a hostile or potentially hostile area*.

105. **Procedures.** The CJEF will use NATO standards and procedures wherever possible to support interoperability.

106. **Handover to a follow-on force.** In the abnormal case where the initial CJEF intervention leads to an enduring operation, the CJEF will handover to another force operating under a different chain of command. Depending on the organisation, size, and shape of any follow-on force provided by international organisations (such as NATO, EU, UN, or the African Union), it is likely that the formal force activation process would begin at the outset of the CJEF deployment. Past experience indicates that the activation warning, and combined joint statement of requirement (CJSOR) process followed by international organisations, can take approximately three months. Therefore, urgent diplomatic engagement is required at the earliest stages of a CJEF operation to establish how the follow-on force would be configured.

107. **CJEF concept of employment.** The UK/France CJEF concept of employment (CJEF CONEMP) amplifies the operational employment and describes the capabilities of the CJEF. It also outlines the force development implications and the identified constraints, lessons and recommendations. Command and control and logistics considerations are contained in annexes to the main CONEMP. Maritime, land, air and communications and information systems considerations are contained in supporting sub-CONEMPS.

Section 3 – Structures

108. **Command and control.** Each of the likely CJEF tasks may demand a bespoke command and control structure. However, all command and control designs should follow a structure whereby national policy decisions produce bilateral political direction to a bilateral CJEF Crisis Contingency Team (CCT). This is covered in greater detail in Chapter 2.

109. **Linkages to other government departments.** The CJEF will build on the strong bilateral links established during recent operations. It will seek to exploit synergies and increased understanding of how other government departments operate within their own countries, and how they interact with their deployed forces and departmental staff.

110. **The maritime component.** The maritime forces required to conduct a CJEF operation will primarily depend on circumstances, and will be generated according to tasks and asset availability. They may include any combination of UK and French maritime assets gathered in a task group, and commanded from a UK/French combined headquarters that could be led by either nation. The key capacities that will enable a combined force to deal with the likely CJEF tasks in the maritime domain will be rapid deployability, command of up to a task force, and the capacity to project power.

111. **The land component.** The land component will be an early entry combined (UK/France) force. It will be capable of conducting non-enduring, complex intervention operations, facing multiple threats up to high intensity. It will be a combined force (as opposed to a fully integrated force) accepting that it may show increasing levels of integration over time. It will operate to a common end. The land component will be a high-readiness force using existing national high readiness force elements – including lead elements at very short notice.

112. **The air component.** The CJEF air component will be a self-sufficient force capable of being generated within 10 days of activation. Dependent upon the size and scale of the operation, it will be capable of operating up to 70 sorties per day. This will include all air assets across the full spectrum of air power roles.⁶ It will be prepared to deliver the full spectrum of air effects in support of CJEF joint fires and influence. Precision of approach and delivery will be its overriding principle.

113. **Logistics.** UK and France will collaborate to share logistic support for the CJEF.⁷ Cooperative logistic planning will commence at the earliest opportunity and logistic operations will typically be commanded by a Combined Joint Support Group (CJSG) headquarters, subordinate to the CJTF headquarters. The Logistic Support Annex to the CJEF CONEMP: outlines the key CJEF logistic principles; articulates how CJEF operations are to be supported logistically; details how logistic command and control will be arranged; assigns logistic responsibilities, services and tasks; and gives guidelines on CJEF finances and administration.

⁶ This is compliant with NATO Response Force task levels detailed in the AD 80-96 of 100 sorties per day to support a brigade-sized manoeuvre unit and was agreed to at 3* FAF/RAF level in the CJEF AIR Component Level of Ambition paper dated 15 February 12 signed by DCINC Ops and Comdt CDAOA.

⁷ Including medical support.

Chapter 2 – The strategic planning processes

Chapter 2 summarises the UK and France's strategic decision making processes and identifies areas of difference and commonality. It also summarises how political strategy reaches the CJEF as combined operational direction.

201. **Introduction.** UK and France differ in their mechanisms for strategic decision making and the two approaches are detailed below. Being aware of both processes will increase our understanding of cross-government decision making and command processes, and ensure more effective bilateral consultation and cooperation. This document identifies areas of commonality and difference, and summarises the procedures for combined political decision making with regards to the employment of the CJEF. The chapter is meant as a general overview and discusses only the processes that are in place in each nation. There is no attempt to interpret how, or why, a decision is reached in a given situation.

202. **UK/France political direction.** Establishing a mechanism for the timely delivery of agreed UK/France political direction to the CJEF Combined Joint Force Commander, including direction to meet decision points to deploy, is key. It is essential that this occurs concurrently with the development of the military headquarters. The mechanism for combined strategic decision making is covered at the end of this chapter.

Section 1 – Strategic decision making in the UK

203. **Political control and direction.** Democratic control and political direction of the Armed Forces are exercised by Ministers, either individually or in committee. Desired outcomes are identified as Government policy, expressed in the form of a national strategic aim, and translated into actionable objectives for national cross-Government strategic planning. Ministers decide on the most effective approach on a case-by-case basis, drawing upon a variety of cross-Government committees. The most significant of these is the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC

provides the mechanism for active cross-Government and multi-agency cooperation, enabling an integrated approach to any campaign.¹

204. **Events.** World events are observed and assessed at the highest political level, and by individual government departments. In particular, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) will be involved. The NSC, chaired by the Prime Minister, then provides the main forum for collective discussion of the Government's objectives for national security, and how best to deliver them. In addition to representation from the FCO, DFID and MOD, the NSC also includes the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for the Home Department and for Energy and Climate Change, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Minister for Government Policy.

205. **Trigger event.** Within the MOD, the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) monitors world events continuously. It takes inputs from the regional departments, and the intelligence services, looking for indicators and warnings of emerging crises. The DCMO has a morning briefing, chaired at 3* (or 2*) level by the senior officer available from the MOD, normally Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations). Also present are representatives from:

- the regional and capability staffs;
- intelligence;
- FCO;
- MOD media staff;
- the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ);
- the single-Service headquarters (Fleet, Land and Air Commands);
- Director Special Forces; and
- UK Delegations to Headquarters NATO, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and the European Union. These join the meeting via video conferencing.

¹ The UK's integrated approach is described in JDP 0-01 4th Edition *British Defence Doctrine*. It requires those dealing with a crisis to be predisposed to collaboration and cooperation, and structured to develop a shared understanding of a situation and its dynamics. This approach should foster collective intent and output-focused objectives, leading more easily to the implementation of mutually supporting activity.

If it becomes apparent that a crisis is emerging, a current operations group (COG) may be formed to study the situation in detail.

206. Current operations group. A current operations group may be convened at 30 minutes' notice. It is chaired by the Operations Directorate and attended by selected regional and capability staffs. The FCO, DFID and Cabinet Office, used to coordinate cross-government activities, are invited to attend so that a common appreciation of events is gained across government. The current operations group assesses the severity of the crisis and considers the options for intervention. The necessity for strategic political direction from the Cabinet is discussed, along with the desired end-state and exit strategy. The current operations group will decide on the need to form a strategic planning group, if one has not already formed, together with a current commitments team dedicated to handling operational problems.

207. Strategic planning group. A strategic planning group (SPG) takes a long-term view. It assesses the crisis to evaluate strategic options, conducts forward planning, and considers end-states. It provides military strategic advice for the political process, and assists the Operations Directorate and PJHQ on strategic issues. It may initiate a grand strategic estimate which seeks to define the:

- UK's national intent and political objectives;
- international community's probable options and intent;
- desirable and acceptable end-states;
- resource implications and constraints; and
- likely reaction of allies.

The process produces assessments of the diplomatic, economic, political and military options open to the UK Government. Effectively, the strategic planning group fulfils the 'plans' or 'J5' role for the MOD.

208. MOD current commitments team. A current commitments team (CCT) is the crisis team formed at MOD. This usually includes staff from regional, capability, intelligence, logistics and movements MOD directorates, and from other government departments. The team is usually only eight to ten people, but will be authoritative. A 2* lead is possible, but a 1* or OF5

lead would be more usual. Initially, the team forms in the offices of its members but, as the crisis deepens, it will move into the Defence Crisis Management Centre in MOD and work continuously. The current commitments team deals with current operational issues concerning the deployment, action and recovery of forces. The current commitments team thus fulfils the 'J3' role for the MOD.

209. **PJHQ contingency planning team.** When the current commitments team forms in MOD, a contingency planning team is also established at PJHQ. The current commitments team and contingency planning team work as a single entity through the medium of video conferencing. Together with the strategic planning group, they produce initial advice on the crisis for the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who then briefs ministers and, when invited, the Cabinet. The strategic planning group will draft the CDS planning directive to the DCMO, based on the political direction given by the Government. The product of the planning process is the military strategic estimate, which is written by PJHQ (based upon the analysis in the grand strategic estimate). The military strategic estimate will detail the military options including the implications for UK and the likely costs.

210. **CDS directive.** CDS presents to the Cabinet the military options identified in the military strategic estimate. In a major crisis, the NSC will form to take the key political decisions. If they decide that UK forces are to be involved in the crisis, they will choose an option and authorise CDS to proceed, through the Secretary of State for Defence.² The current commitments team will then draft the CDS directive that will, *inter alia*, nominate a Joint Commander – normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) (3* Commander at PJHQ). The CDS directive will also detail the UK's aim, desired end-state, and any constraints set by the Cabinet.

211. **PJHQ operations team.** On receiving the CDS directive, PJHQ expands the small contingency planning team to become an operations team. This then exercises *Operational Command* to deploy, sustain and recover the committed forces. The operations team issues a mission directive to the Joint Task Force Commander who would carry out his own estimate, and then

² The role of Ministers, CDS, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) and Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) in the conduct of operations is amplified in the *Blueprint for the New Operating Model*, version 2.0 dated June 2012, paragraph 3.3 onwards.

maintains a continual 2-way flow of advice upward to Government, and clear direction down to subordinates.

212. **The Stabilisation Unit.** On completion of the combat phase of operations, MOD becomes a supporting department to the Stabilisation Unit, (as well as DFID and FCO). The Stabilisation Unit is a cross-Government organisation which will be closely involved in both the strategic planning group and current commitments team. It provides the coordination of the UK contribution in the crisis country for the reconstruction and economic recovery effort.

Section 2 – Strategic decision making in France

213. **Introduction.** Any decision to engage the French forces in operations is made by the President of the Republic, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, following a political and military decision-making process. The Defence Minister and the Chef d'État Major des Armées (CEMA), Chief of the Defence Staff, participate in this process. The CEMA then becomes the operational-level commander of the forces in operations. The Strategic Operations Planning and Control Centre (SOPCC or CPCO³) is the tool enabling anticipation in the crisis. It is used to plan, command and control all the operations conducted by French forces around the world.

214. **Crisis management.** Crisis management requires the coordination of the three levers: diplomatic, military, and media, but excludes any delegation. Crisis management is a highly centralised process. The speed of communication as well as media interest may also force political authorities to make frequent reassessments of the situation. To be effective, the crisis management process must be swift. These two factors, centralisation and speed, lead France to adopt the process described below.

215. **Trigger event.** The response process is triggered by an event – either physical or political – that may have an impact on the safety of French nationals, or the interests of France. The event could be reported by various channels (media, Defence Attachés, allied partners, Military Intelligence Directorate). The event is immediately analysed by different experts in the:

³ CPCO : Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations.

- Elysée Palace, by the President's own military staff;
- Hotel Matignon, by the Prime Minister's military advisors;
- Ministry of Defence;
- other concerned Ministries (mainly the Foreign Affairs Ministry); and
- various governmental coordination cells.

216. The analysis initiates a planning process which will not necessarily lead to the engagement of forces. However, in case of an emergency, planning can be very fast, and rapidly lead to a decision to engage French forces. Whatever the event, the process is the same; it can take a few weeks or a few hours, depending on the situation.

217. **Assessment of the military situation.** The analysis leads to the assessment of the military situation that is carried out in close cooperation with the Military Intelligence Directorate (DRM)⁴. They assess the relative risks to the local population and to the forces, and work out several military options.

218. **The role of the Chef d'État Major des Armées.** These military options are proposed by the CEMA to the Government. The CEMA has a dual role, as the military adviser to the Government and the operational commander of the forces. CEMA participates in the decision-making process from the beginning of a crisis until the decision is made to commit the forces (if deemed necessary). Once the engagement is decided, the CEMA becomes the operational-level commander of the forces. In his dual role, the CEMA is in the best position to advise the Government on operations, and to assume the responsibility for their conduct.

219. **Defence and National Security Council and Restricted Council.** During the session of the Council, in which the Defence Minister and the CEMA take part, the President takes his final decision concerning the commitment of the forces. In addition, once the operation has been decided (and as a direct subordinate to the President and the Government), the CEMA assumes, at strategic level, the operational command of all the French forces committed.

⁴ DRM: Direction du Renseignement Militaire.

220. **Action.** The decision to commit the forces is then transmitted by the CEMA to the Strategic Operations Planning and Control Centre (CPCO). The CPCO assumes responsibility for operational-level planning, and especially for developing the concept of operation (CONOPS), and the operation plan (OPLAN), to generate the force and prepare it for deployment. It then assumes conduct of the operation under the CEMA. The operation order (OPORD) includes an assessment of the situation, mission, assets involved, and rules of engagement. After taking part in the decision-making process, the CPCO becomes the tool used by the CEMA (as operational commander) to command and control the forces at the strategic level.

221. **Decision making process.** Parliament is not directly involved in the French decisional process. However, since July 2008, Parliament has a control role on French military involvements. After four months' involvement, its approval is required to decide whether involvement is to be continued. In addition, since 2003, military operations are funded on a special budget which is part of the annual budget of the State voted by the Parliament.

Section 3 – Turning political strategy into CJEF operational-level direction

222. **CJEF command and control design.** The two national processes described above will provide bilateral direction to the CJEF in a command and control design broadly following the structure shown in Figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1 – CJEF command and control construct

223. **Activation.** The CJEF will be activated by a bilateral political decision following consultation between the UK Prime Minister and the French President, or their authorised representatives. Concurrently, supporting consultation, the UK and French planning staffs will propose the end-state, strategic objectives, broad strategic options and develop the strategic narrative. Liaison will ensure coordination. Independent UK and French national military planning assessments will be formally brought together by

the formation of a CJEF Crisis Contingency Team based at either the UK MOD or the French CPCO (Strategic Operations Planning and Control Centre). Concurrently, liaison detachments from the crisis contingency team will be placed in the non-hosting nation's headquarters.

224. Strategic direction. A UK/French group at CDS/CEMA level will provide strategic direction to the CJEF for deployed operations. This will be delivered through the CJEF crisis contingency team to a single military operational-level headquarters, located in the UK or France. This operational-level headquarters will conduct the UK/France-led operations at the military strategic level of command. Early strategic decisions include:


- designating the operation commander and force commander;
- designating the command and control structure, lead nation, framework nation;
- deciding the location of the operation headquarters (PJHQ or Mont Valérien);
- activating the CJTF headquarters; and
- scoping the combined logistics operations.

225. Operational-level planning. The UK and French operational-level planning processes are tabulated at Annex 2A. The annex provides an overview of the processes as an aid to mutual understanding during concurrent planning. The sequence of operations planning is broadly similar for both UK and French staffs, although the terminology used clearly differs. The annex is confined to outlining the process. It does not attempt to address why a decision is reached in a given situation.



226. Conduct of operations. The 1* or 2*-led CJTF deployable headquarters will deploy to the joint operations area to conduct operations. The CJEF Crisis Contingency Team, operation headquarters and CJTF deployable headquarters will include UK and French staff. The roles and responsibilities of the operational-level and CJTF headquarters are detailed in the Command and Control Annex to the CJEF CONEMP.

Annex 2A – Operational-level planning processes


France's method (MPO MOD V1.4 ter)




UK's operational estimate

(From JDP 5-00 3rd Edition ratification draft)


STEP 3 – FORMULATE POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION




STEP 4 – DEVELOP AND VALIDATE COURSES OF ACTION



STEP 5 – EVALUATE COURSES OF ACTION



STEP 6 – COMMANDER'S DECISION



Legend:

France

DSP directive stratégique de planification
DB decision briefing
DTA dossier thématique d'anticipation
MPP mesures de précaution et préalables
PIR priority intelligence requirements

UK

PESTLE political, economic, sociological, technological, legal and environmental strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
SWOT political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information commander's critical information requirements
PMESII
CCIRs

Chapter 3 – The doctrinal basis for CJEF operations

Chapter 3 provides an overview of existing NATO doctrine. This will provide the basis for CJEF operations, and the authority for the eventual development of the necessary CJEF headquarters handbooks and standard operating procedures. It will also show where UK and French doctrine fits into the NATO doctrine architecture.

Section 1 – Key source documentation

301. **References.** Wherever possible and relevant for the projected operation and forces, CJEF operations will adhere to already-agreed NATO doctrinal principles and standard procedures. This will facilitate effective UK/France operations and enable other nations to contribute more easily to future operations. This does not imply NATO involvement, rather it is considered a practical solution to enable bilateral interoperability. The key reference documents are listed below.

a. **Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(D) *Allied Joint Doctrine*** provides capstone doctrine for Allied joint operations. It is intended primarily for NATO forces, and reflects recent changes in NATO policy – particularly the comprehensive approach. The doctrine is also coherent with the 2010 Lisbon Summit. AJP-01(D) explains the principles that underpin the planning and conduct of NATO campaigns and major operations. It provides commanders with the strategic context for such operations and identifies their operational-level challenges. Finally, it provides the commander with guidance and strategies to direct successful campaigns.

b. **AJP-5 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning***. AJP-5 is aimed primarily at those engaged in operational-level planning; specifically commanders and staffs employed in joint force command headquarters and component command headquarters. It describes the fundamental aspects of planning joint operations at the operational level.

c. **AJP-3(B) *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operation*.**

AJP-3(B) describes the fundamental operational-level aspects of joint operations and provides guidance on the conduct of joint operations at the operational level. Most operations will take place in all environments (maritime, land, air, space, and information including cyberspace) while some will predominantly favour a single one. The level of joint participation may vary and is likely to include non-military agencies, institutions or organisations. The guidance is authoritative. As such this doctrine should be followed except when, in the judgement of the commander, circumstances dictate otherwise.

d. **Multinational Interoperability Council *Coalition Building Guide Edition 2*.**

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) membership¹ includes both the UK and France. The MIC Coalition Building Guide seeks to identify those essential factors associated with coalition building, within the context of multinational military operations, to assist a lead nation, coalition force commander and coalition staff. It concentrates on the strategic and operational levels of multinational joint operations. It also attempts to provide a common reference for contributing nations.

e. **Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.** The Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) developed by NATO is detailed but cumbersome, and optimised for NATO structures. Both the UK and France are more familiar with national planning methods. France is currently refining the COPD for its own planning purposes. For CJEF operations planning, the COPD should be used until an agreed alternative is identified.

f. **CJEF Concept of Employment and sub-Concepts of Employments.** The main Concept of Employment (CONEMP) describes how the CJEF will be generated, what it will be deployed to do, and how it will be employed. The Command and Control Annex to the CONEMP describes the bilateral decision and planning process, sharing of responsibilities between structures, the CJEF headquarters and the systems (for example, communications and cryptography)

¹ Other nations that belong to the Multinational Interoperability Council are: Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, and the US.

related to command and control. The Logistic Annex describes the agreed method of bilateral support of deployed CJEF forces. The Maritime, Land and Air sub-CONEMPs show what the component force elements need to be capable of as part of the CJEF, specifically covering the likely CJEF tasks.

g. **American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies programme.** The American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies (ABCA) programme seeks to optimise ABCA Armies' interoperability to deliver success on coalition operations. Although France is not a member, the handbooks provide a series of practical checklists on capacity building, coalition operations, logistics, intelligence and health in the land environment.

Section 2 – The doctrinal architecture

302. **The NATO doctrinal architecture.** The NATO doctrinal architecture is almost comprehensive but not all publications are fully endorsed by both UK and France. Wherever possible, the UK and France will attempt to apply doctrinal principles from AJP. Other NATO or national publications will only be applied once the divergences between the two nations' approaches are at the very least identified. The areas of assessed doctrinal commonality and divergence are shown at Annex 3A.

303. **Implications.** Out of the 42 NATO publications identified in the Annex 3A, only 19 are ratified and implemented by both the UK and France. There are areas of national divergence from NATO doctrine in:

- human intelligence;
- information operations;
- psychological operations;
- engineering support;
- force protection;
- land operations;
- military policing;
- air and space operations;

The doctrinal basis for CJEF operations

- counter-air operations;
- close air support and air interdiction;
- joint airspace control;
- counterinsurgency;
- electronic warfare;
- joint targeting; and
- logistics.

304. The CJEF tasks identified in Chapter 1 will include one or more of the activities identified above. Planners must take account of the differences in doctrinal approach at the onset of planning, and must not make assumptions that NATO or national doctrine will apply to all aspects of a CJEF operation. Consultation and careful collaboration will be required to identify the doctrine appropriate to every CJEF operation.

Annex 3A - National coherence with NATO doctrine

<https://nsa.nato.int/protected/nsdd/CommonList.html>

Short Title	Long Title	NATO STATUS	NATO Sponsor	FR and UK National Position	National Doctrine	CJEF Recommendation
STANAG 2437	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE - AJP-01(D)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CIA-01. Armed Force Employment Concept	AJP-01(D)
Ed: 7				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 0-01 (Ed 4). British Defence Doctrine JDP 01 (Ed 2) Campaigning	
STANAG 2190	JOINT INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DOCTRINE - AJP-2	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, JINT	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CIA-2 & DIA-2. Intelligence	AJP-2
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 2-00 (Ed 3). Understanding and Intelligence Support to Operations JDP 4-00 Understanding	
STANAG 2191	INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES - AJP-2.1(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, JINT	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP-2.1(A)
Ed: 2				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2192	COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROCEDURES - AJP-2.2	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, JINT	FR Ratifying and Implementing with Comments		AJP-2.2
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing with Comments		
STANAG 2537	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR HUMAN INTELLIGENCE - AJP-2.3	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, JINT	FR Ratifying, Implementing with Reservations	FR: DIA 2.3: Human Intelligence	
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2195	CAPTURED PERSONS, MATERIEL AND DOCUMENTS - AJP-2.5(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, JINT	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CIA 3.2.3.3.1 Captured Persons	AJP-2.5(A)
Ed: 2				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 1-10 (Ed 2) Captured Persons (CPERS)	
STANAG 7107	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE – AJP-2.7	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, JINT JISRP	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CEIA 6.2 SA2R	AJP-2.7
Ed: 2				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2490	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS- AJP-3(B)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: DIA 3: Commanding Operations DIA 3.02 Operation Commander	AJP-3
Ed: 3				UK Ratifying and Implementing	JDP 3-00 (Ed 3) Campaign Execution	
STANAG 1459	ALLIED JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS - AJP-3.1	PROMULGATED	MC, MCMSB, MAROPS	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP-3.1
Ed: 2				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 0-10 British Maritime Doctrine	
STANAG 2518	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS - AJP-3.10	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CIA 3.10 Influence Operations	
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Future Implementation	UK: JDP 3-80 Information Operations	

Short Title	Long Title	NATO STATUS	NATO Sponsor	FR and UK National Position	National Doctrine	CJEF Recommendation
STANAG 2508	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - AJP- 3.10.1(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 3-80.1 Psychological Operations, Operations Security and Deception (R)	
Ed: 3				UK Not Ratifying		
STANAG 2507	ALLIED DOCTRINE FOR METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TO JOINT FORCES - AJP-3.11	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP-3.11
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2238	ALLIED DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS - AJP-3.12(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCLSB, MILENG	FR Ratifying and Implementing		
Ed: 2				UK Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations		
STANAG 2532	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES - AJP-3.13	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP-3.13
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2528	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR FORCE PROTECTION - AJP-3.14	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CIA 3.14 Force Protection	
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations	UK: JDP 3-64 Force Protection JDP 3-64.1 Force Protection Engineering	
STANAG 2295	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTER IMPROVED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (C-IED) - AJP - 3.15(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCLSB, C-IED	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CIA 3.15 EEI	AJP-3.15(A)
Ed: 2				UK Ratifying and Implementing with Comments	UK: JDP 3-65 (AJP-3.15(A)) Counter-IED	
STANAG 2288	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND OPERATIONS - AJP-3.2	PROMULGATED	MC, MCLSB, LO	FR Ratifying, Implementing		
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying, Future Implementation		
STANAG 2296	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY POLICE - AJP-3.2.3.3	PROMULGATED	MC, MCLSB, LO	FR Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations		
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 3700	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS - AJP-3.3(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCASB, AO	FR Not Participating until next edition	UK: AP 3000 (Ed 4) British Air and Space Power Doctrine	
Ed: 7				UK Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations		

Short Title	Long Title	NATO STATUS	NATO Sponsor	FR and UK National Position	National Doctrine	CJEF Recommendation
STANAG 3880	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTER-AIR OPERATIONS- AJP-3.3.1(B)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCASB, AO	FR Ratifying, Implementing		
Ed: 6				UK Ratifying and Future Implementation		
STANAG 3736	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND AIR INTERDICTION- AJP-3.3.2(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCASB, AO	FR Not Participating,	FR: DIA 3.3.2 Air Support	
Ed: 11				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 3703	AIR MARITIME CO-ORDINATION (AMC) - AJP-3.3.3 (ATP-34)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCASB, AO	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP 3.3.3
Ed: 8				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 3805	DOCTRINE FOR JOINT AIRSPACE CONTROL - AJP-3.3.5(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCASB, AO	FR Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations		
Ed: 8				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2180	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR FOR NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS - AJP-3.4(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations		
Ed: 2				UK Ratifying and Future Implementation	UK: JDP 3-52 (Ed 2) Disaster Relief Operations	
STANAG 2181	PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS - AJP-3.4.1	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP 3.4.1
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JWP 3-50 Peace Support Operations	
STANAG 2514	NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS - AJP-3.4.2	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: DIA 3.4.2 RESEVAC	Lead Nation National Doctrine?
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JWP 3-51 (Chg 1) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations. JDP in draft	
STANAG 2611	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) - AJP-3.4.4	PROMULGATED	MC, MCLSB, LO	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: DIA 3.4.4 COIN	
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations	UK: JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution	
STANAG 2523	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS - AJP-3.5	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP-3.5
Ed: 1				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 3-05 Special Forces Operations (R)	
STANAG 6018	ALLIED JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE DOCTRINE - AJP-3.6(A)	PROMULGATED	MC, NEWAC	FR Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations		
Ed: 2				UK Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations		

Short Title	Long Title	NATO STATUS	NATO Sponsor	FR and UK National Position	National Doctrine	CJEF Recommendation
STANAG 2451 Ed: 4	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE - AJP-3.8 EDITION A VERSION1	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, CBRN	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: DIA 3.8 NRBC	
				UK No Response	UK: JWP 3-61.1 NBC Defence JWP 3-61.1.1 Manual of NBD Defence	
STANAG 2524 Ed: 1	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR JOINT TARGETING - AJP-3.9	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations	FR: DIA 3.9 Targeting	
				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2285 Ed: 1	LAND TARGETING - AJP-3.9.2	PROMULGATED	MC, MCLSB, LO	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP-3.9.2
				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2182 Ed: 2	ALLIED JOINT LOGISTIC DOCTRINE - AJP- 4(A)	PROMULGATED	LC, LC, Bi-SC LCB	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CIA & DIA 4 Support (<i>in progress</i>)	AJP-4(A)
				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 4-00 (Ed 3) Logistics for Joint Operations	
STANAG 2228 Ed: 2	ALLIED JOINT MEDICAL SUPPORT DOCTRINE - AJP-4.10(A)	PROMULGATED	COMEDS, MCMedSB, MMSOP	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP-4.10(A)
				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 4-03 (Ed 3) Joint Medical Doctrine JDP 4-03.1 Clinical Guidelines for Operations	
STANAG 2292 Ed: 1	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR NATO ASSET VISIBILITY - AJP-4.11	PROMULGATED	MC, MCLSB, AST	FR Ratifying and Implementing		
				UK Ratifying and Future Implementation		
STANAG 2506 Ed: 2	ALLIED JOINT MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION DOCTRINE - AJP-4.4(A)	PROMULGATED	LC, LC, Bi-SC M-T Forum	FR Ratifying and Implementing		
				UK No Response		
STANAG 2234 Ed: 2	ALLIED JOINT HOST NATION SUPPORT DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES - AJP-4.5(A)	PROMULGATED	LC, LC, Bi-SC LCB	FR Not Participating,	FR: CIA 4.5 France as a Host Nation	
				UK No Response		
STANAG 2230 Ed: 2	MULTINATIONAL JOINT LOGISTICS CENTRE (MJLC) DOCTRINE - AJP-4.6(A)	PROMULGATED	LC, LC, Bi-SC LCB	FR Ratifying and Implementing		AJP-4.6(A)
				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2536 Ed: 1	ALLIED JOINT PETROLEUM DOCTRINE - AJP- 4.7	PROMULGATED	PC, PC, NFLWG	FR Ratifying and Implementing with Reservations		
				UK Ratifying and Implementing		

Short Title	Long Title	NATO STATUS	NATO Sponsor	FR and UK National Position	National Doctrine	CJEF Recommendation
STANAG 2512 Ed: 1	MODES OF MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT - AJP-4.9	PROMULGATED	LC, LC, Bi-SC LCB	FR Not Participating,		
				UK Ratifying and Implementing		
STANAG 2525 Ed: 1	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS - AJP-6	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing		
				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 6-00 (Ed 3, Chg 1) CIS Support to Joint Operations	
STANAG 2509 Ed: 1	NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE - AJP-9	PROMULGATED	MC, MCJSB, AJOD	FR Ratifying and Implementing	FR: CIA 9 CIMIC	AJP-9
				UK Ratifying and Implementing	UK: JDP 3-90 Civil-Military Co-operation	

Chapter 4 – CJEF operations

Chapter 4 addresses command and control, communication and information systems, information sharing and logistics in CJEF operations. It summarises the CJEF operating concepts in the maritime, land and air environments.

Section 1 – Command and control

401. **Command.** At the strategic level a UK/French group at Chief of Defence Staff/Chef d'État Major des Armées level will provide strategic direction to the CJEF for operations. The strategic body will issue directions to the operational-level headquarters. This headquarters will be located in either the UK or France depending on the situation, and will always include augmentees from the other nation. The operational headquarters will issue its orders to a deployable scalable CJEF Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters which will be led by a framework nation with augmentees from the other nation.

402. **National contributions.** It is expected that both the operational and CJTF headquarters will be led by the same framework nation where possible, but this is not essential. The commander will be from the framework nation and the deputy commander from the other nation.

403. **Component or direct command.** If required at the tactical level, component headquarters may be commanded at the 1* level. Alternatively, depending on the situation and the mission, it may be more appropriate to have one or more environmental cells within a CJTF headquarters.

404. **Full spectrum targeting.** Implementing a full spectrum approach to targeting will greatly enhance the effectiveness of CJEF operations. Some considerations for the development of this approach are at Annex 4A. The annex articulates a common understanding of full spectrum targeting (FST), and some of the key areas that must be considered to develop full targeting spectrum capability within the CJEF.

Section 2 – Communications and information

405. **Information flow.** The CJEF will need to pass electronic information securely between the UK and French authorities, including distribution down to, and among, the deployed force elements. This could include data, voice and video/imagery. There may also be a requirement during operations to include other coalition forces. These may be NATO, EU or other regional partners.

406. **Communication and information systems.** As the force uses NATO standards and procedures, the main issue will be to further develop the information-sharing policy and recognised joint and environmental pictures to prevail in the most complex operations in a hostile environment. These areas are still being developed.

407. **Tactical communications.** This area is also being developed.

408. **Information sharing.** The sharing of accurate and updated information and intelligence is necessary for the conduct of bilateral operations. Unclassified details of information-sharing protocols and policy will be included in this guide in future iterations.

409. **Common operating picture.** This area is also being developed.

Section 3 – Combined Joint Support Group

410. **Operational capability.** Once at full operational capability, the Combined Joint Support Group (CJSG) should be able to plan and deliver a common joint support solution to deploy, sustain and recover the CJEF. It will maximise the common use of UK and French logistics resources including, if necessary, the use of outsourced logistic support.

411. **Scale and command.** The CJSG will need to be scalable and should, wherever possible, be totally integrated. It should also be prepared to host the national support element function where that is practicable. The force commander is responsible for logistic planning and coordination to support the CJEF. To make optimal use of available resources, both nations must provide the force commander with the required information, capabilities and

the necessary authority (LOGCON).¹ When established, commander CJSG will have responsibility for the command and control of the logistic resources assigned to the CJSG, to deliver operational (theatre)-level logistic support and coordinate theatre-wide logistic support.

412. Integration. Both nations' authorities have a collective responsibility to provide effective and efficient logistic support to CJEF operations. During the planning phase and the force generation process, the operational headquarters will establish a collaborative logistic operations planning process that engages both nations at the earliest opportunity to implement combined logistic solutions. These will draw on agreed arrangements established prior to the operation. The use of NATO standards and procedures wherever possible will stimulate greater interoperability and coherence in our logistics arrangements. Either the UK or France will lead with host nation support arrangements, although assurance of local facilities, especially medical, shall remain a national responsibility.

413. General capabilities. Sustaining the force will ultimately be a national responsibility. However, the ambition for the CJEF is to have combined and joint sustainment achieved from the deployment of the first force elements. Wherever possible the UK and France should share resources. Contractor logistics support will be used if appropriate; the CJEF will try to achieve this using either existing national arrangements, or through a new third party contract integrator arrangement which could support both nations concurrently.

414. Combined Joint Support Group principles. Principles for logistic support to CJEF operations are detailed in the Logistic Annex to the CJEF CONEMP. This annex outlines how CJEF operations are to be supported logistically, and how logistic command and control will be arranged. It seeks to allocate logistic responsibilities, commodities, services and tasks. It will also give guidelines on financial and administrative aspects of CJEF.

¹Logistics Control (LOGCON): That authority granted to a Commander over assigned logistics units and organisations in the JOA, including National Support Elements (NSE), that empowers him to synchronise, prioritise, and integrate their logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission. It does not confer authority over the nationally-owned resources held by an NSE, except as agreed in the Transfer of Authority or in accordance with NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics. LOGCON is the minimum C2 authority that should be employed. As defined in AJP-3(B) *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

Section 4 – CJEF components

The maritime component

415. **Operational capability.** At full operational capability in 2016, the maritime component should consist of task units, working within combined task groups, capable of operating within a task force across the full spectrum of maritime power roles. The maritime component headquarters should be able to plan, deploy, command, operate and recover maritime security and power projection assets, including amphibious and carrier-strike, operating as a combined task force consisting of maritime assets of any type from either nation.

416. **Scale and command.** The maritime component will be up to a task group based on a capital ship (aircraft carrier or landing platform dock/helicopter). The forces required to conduct a CJEF operation will primarily depend on circumstances and will be generated according to tasks and assets availability. They may include any combination of UK/French maritime assets gathered in a task group commanded from a UK/French combined headquarters, led by either nation.

417. **Command and control of fixed wing embarked on carriers.**
Reserved.

418. **Organisation.** The integrated maritime planning capacity may rely on existing staffs. The battle staffs will be built up on existing national structures, as detailed in the maritime sub-CONEMP.

419. **Integration.** Whatever the complexity of the operations, a high level of integration will be sought between staffs (CJTf headquarters and maritime component headquarters). This will ensure proper coordination of effects, and coherence of goals within each staff (be it UK or French-led) so that the forces committed by both nations are commanded competently. This integration could see:

- either nations' assets operating from the other's platforms; and
- platforms of one nation under command of the other's lead of a component.

420. To ease integration, NATO procedures will be used by both UK and French assets of the maritime force. NATO concepts and doctrine already constitute the common work basis for both navies. The only additional concept that needs to be developed is the UK-France Carrier Strike CONEMP.

421. **General capabilities.** The key capabilities that will enable a combined force to deal with the likely CJEF tasks in the maritime domain are listed below.

- a. The ability to rapidly deploy a naval forward element, joined later by a full task group if required. The notice to move for forces will be defined by each nation based primarily upon its high readiness forces. The period required to build up and deploy the remainder of the maritime component will depend on its composition, but should be expected not to exceed 30 days.
- b. The ability to command a maritime component of up to a task force, based on one or several capital ships (aircraft/helicopter carriers or amphibious ships).
- c. The capacity to project power, whether aircraft or troops, depending on the nature of the operation.

422. **Maritime component tasks.** Sea control will remain the principal requirement for the maritime element of the CJEF and the essential prerequisite for the projection of military power, even when an operation is inland. The maritime component contribution to the potential CJEF tasks is amplified in the Maritime sub-CONEMP.

The land component

423. **Operational capability.** At full operational capability in 2016, the land component should be able to plan, execute, command and support joint and combined full spectrum operations up to formation level (grande unité). This includes elements conducting airborne and amphibious operations.

424. **Scale and command.** The combined UK/French land component will consist of a minimum of a combined UK/French 1* headquarters in command of at least a UK battlegroup, a French equivalent and key enablers. In specific circumstances there may be a requirement for a 2* land component headquarters as amplified in the CJEF Land sub-CONEMP.

425. **Organisation.** The land component of the CJEF, as an early entry force, will be characterised by rapid deployability. It will have correspondingly limited lethality, protection, duration and range (intra-theatre) relative to any non-CJEF follow-on forces. The requirement to deploy rapidly will lead to the initial force elements being drawn from light, or lightly equipped, forces at very high or high readiness.

426. **Integration.** In principle the land component headquarters will be integrated, with the subordinate force elements operating under their own national doctrine. The land component headquarters should operate under a single agreed set of standing operating instructions/standing operating procedures, which the subordinate force elements will need to incorporate into their procedures. Essential to the mission will be a clear understanding of each other's doctrine.

427. **General capabilities.** The land component should be able to conduct offensive or defensive (both lethal and non-lethal) actions in, or near, urban areas, among the population, facing a regular and/or irregular threat. While maintaining force protection, it must be capable of conducting control, neutralisation and destruction actions.²

428. **Land component tasks.** Common to all tasks will be a requirement for the land component to prepare, deploy, operate and redeploy as amplified in the Land sub-CONEMP. The land component contribution to the CJEF tasks is also amplified in the sub-CONEMP.

The air component

429. **Operational capability.** At full operational capability in 2016, the air component should be able to conduct combined air operations. This may

² FR taxonomy.

include carrier-borne aircraft to support the necessary air power roles to enable complex operations by the CJEF.

430. **Scale and command.** Dependent upon the size and scale of the CJEF operation, the CJEF air component will be capable of operating up to 70 sorties per day, including all air assets across the full spectrum of air power roles. It will operate under unity of command, and will lead the air domain with a Combined Joint Force Air Component Headquarters (CJFACHQ) that will be established from the outset of the operation. The execution of air operations will be centralised or decentralised depending on the prevailing circumstances. A single recognised air picture will be provided by the CJFACHQ to the CJTF headquarters. Command and control will be enabled by the component or direct method, both described in the Air sub-CONEMP.

431. **Organisation.** The CJEF air component will be prepared to operate alone, but would expect to operate under a joint force construct. Wherever and whenever possible, the principle of multi-role, inherent to all air platforms, will be maximised. This will reduce the deployed footprint while expanding the range of available effects to the force commander.

432. **Integration.** The CJEF air component will fully integrate down to a level that is appropriate and necessary to deliver optimum CJEF effect within overall, pragmatic resource constraints. Where this is not possible, activity will be co-ordinated and deconflicted. It is anticipated that the main limiting factor will be the provision of effective communications and information systems as a key enabler for command and control, along with the development of tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as ways of working.

433. **General capabilities.** The capabilities delivered by the CJEF air component in support of likely CJEF tasks include:

- air command and control;
- control of the air and space;
- attack;

- air mobility; and
- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

These capabilities are amplified in the Air sub-CONEMP.

Amphibious operations

434. The UK and France have different organisations to manage amphibious operations. In the UK, the Royal Marines is part of the Royal Navy, and amphibious issues below Joint Force Headquarters level are addressed by the Maritime component commander. In France, the Troupes de Marine are part of the Army. This means that amphibious issues are always developed at the joint level, although they are conducted in accordance with NATO doctrine. Both the UK and France have ratified, and are implementing, NATO doctrine for amphibious operations.³

³ STANAG 1149 AMPHIBOPS (Edition 2) - ATP-8(B), Volume 1 *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*

Annex 4A – Full spectrum targeting within the UK/France CJEF framework

4A1. This annex is the product of a combined UK/France full spectrum targeting (FST) seminar held at the Ecolé Militaire, Paris on 25 October 2012. It articulates a common understanding of full spectrum targeting and some of the key areas that must be considered to develop this capability within the CJEF. Developing knowledge and understanding of the operational environment, which includes the information environment, requires time and multidisciplinary contributions. National complications are also increased in bilateral arena.

4A2. Full spectrum targeting is a philosophy, a process and a capability.

a. **Philosophy.** Full spectrum targeting is defined as: *a holistic approach to targeting reviewing all targets together and apportioning action (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the campaign information strategy and desired behavioural objectives.*¹

b. **Process.** Joint targeting is the process by which the commander's objective, guidance and intent are translated into executable actions through the established process known as the *joint targeting cycle*.

c. **Capability.** The capability consists of trained personnel supported by the appropriate doctrine, organisation and equipment. They plan, integrate and execute lethal and non-lethal activities to generate effects in accordance with the commander's plan, across the physical, virtual and cognitive domains.

4A3. Wherever possible, and where relevant for the projected operation and forces, CJEF operations will adhere to already agreed NATO doctrinal principles and standard procedures.

¹ JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition, Change 1 *Campaign Execution* Annex 3B.

Strategic communication (STRATCOM) and narratives

4A4. Effective operations in the contemporary operating environment depend on an integrated approach across government. UK and France should continue to develop their existing models for interdepartmental cooperation and, wherever possible, do so on a bilateral basis.

4A5. A common narrative will be a vital component in the planning and direction for FST.² UK and French planning staffs should continue to develop their understanding of the role of narratives in operations. The ongoing work within the Multinational Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE) can assist this.³

4A6. UK and France each enjoy significant influence around the globe based on historical, cultural and economic engagements. This could be leveraged by France and UK acting as lead nations in their region of historical influence. This, and associated sharing of information, would save time, improve understanding, and reduce assessment gaps.

Command and control considerations

4A7. Full spectrum targeting occurs at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The key coordination role lies at the operational level.

4A8. To coordinate full spectrum targeting, the operational headquarters must contain an full spectrum targeting cell capable of planning and integrating information activities, fires and cyber.⁴ UK and France should develop a common full spectrum targeting estimate for CJEF, building on their existing processes. This could form the basis for a standardised format across NATO.

4A9. Since current planning is based on a three-month operation, for the CJEF to be effective, information sharing on national contingency planning, supported by combined training, must be the norm. Existing liaison structures can assist with this.

² Narratives are compelling story lines which explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn (Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman).

³ The MNIOE is a German-led initiative to drive innovation and development of the information operations function.

⁴ This includes psychological operations, public affairs/media operations, electronic warfare, key leader engagement and civil-military cooperation.

4A10. Wherever possible command and control should use NATO CIS systems.

4A11. Effective full spectrum targeting depends on the following strategic level directions:

- the strategic narrative;
- assumptions;
- the effects to be achieved; and
- the targeting directive.

4A12. Nevertheless, early planning may have to start without full strategic direction and the operational commander may craft a local narrative to assist with this. However, this must be in accordance with the political intent.

4A13. UK and France must develop a standardised format for target folders. This could form the basis for a standardised format across NATO.

4A14. Wherever possible, target engagement authority should be delegated to the lowest appropriate level.

UK/France full spectrum targeting capabilities

4A15. To address capability gaps, the CJEF may need to seek the use of other nations' assets. A basic unclassified audit of UK and French capabilities to support full spectrum targeting is at Appendix 1.

Full spectrum targeting assessment

4A16. Campaign assessment will occur at all levels (political/military, strategic, operational and tactical), and each level must be linked with the others. Although the time required to assess the effect of non-lethal capabilities may be greater than the expected deployment of the CJEF, their assessment remains vital. CJEF staff must develop an assessment plan for both lethal *and* non-lethal effects that can be handed over to any follow-on force.

4A17. Assessment is ultimately subjective but must be based on objective analysis, particularly regarding non-lethal effects. Measures of effects (MOE) are the most important element of full spectrum targeting assessment but measures of activity (MOA) and performance (MOP) contribute to this.

4A18. A draft FST assessment framework should include:

- a thorough examination of the environment including target system, human terrain and target audience analysis to establish a baseline of understanding;
- an understanding of the effect the CJEF seeks to generate;
- indicators that will show trends towards that effect;
- how the indicators can be recognised; and
- what collection assets are required.

Legal issues

4A19. UK and French legal staff should develop a working relationship which takes account of national issues, including but not limited to rules of engagement, for lethal and non-lethal capabilities.

Appendix 4A1 – Full spectrum targeting capabilities

Capabilities	UK	France
Leaflet production	✓	✓
Leaflet dropping	x	✓
Leaflet canisters	x	x
Radio recording	✓	✓
Radio Maritime	✓	✓
Radio Air	x	x
Radio Land	✓	✓
CIMIC	✓	✓
Direct TV over broadcast	x	x
TV broadcast recording	✓	✓
Cultural and linguistic support to production	limited	limited
Social media	✓	✓
SMS	✓	✓
Bilateral integration	✓	✓
Precision guided munitions (maritime)	✓	✓
Precision guided munitions (land)	✓	✓
Precision guided munitions (air)	✓	✓
Geospatial Point Mensuration	✓	✓
ISR for time-sensitive targeting (maritime)		limited
ISR for time-sensitive targeting (land)	limited	limited
ISR for time-sensitive targeting (air)	limited	limited
Electronic warfare (maritime)	limited	limited
Electronic warfare (land)	limited	limited

Capabilities	UK	France
Electronic warfare (air)	limited	limited
Cyber	limited	limited
Full spectrum targeting doctrine	limited/work in progress	limited/work in progress
Structures	limited/work in progress	limited/work in progress
Individual and collective training	limited/work in progress	limited/work in progress
Interoperability	limited/work in progress	limited/work in progress
Target audience analysis	limited/work in progress	limited/work in progress
Battle damage assessment measure of effects	limited/work in progress	limited/work in progress

Chapter 5 – CJEF training and exercises

Chapter 5 addresses training and exercises, focussing on the forthcoming years ending at the final *validation of concept* in 2016.

501. A specific CJEF training plan will culminate in a combined joint exercise in 2016, based on a crisis management and complex intervention scenario, that will allow CJEF to assess its progress and declare *final validation of concept* (FVOC).¹ This training plan will be a living document which will be updated as the CJEF develops.

502. Specific CJEF training objectives will be updated on a regular basis from the outputs from the various CJEF Working Groups, articulated as a joint task list. Principally, CJEF training will focus on:

- improving interoperability at the joint and component levels;
- developing a common concept of employment;
- developing common procedures;
- improving information sharing;
- identifying and developing a common command structure; and
- developing a logistic framework.²

503. The CJEF will be developed in three stages.

- a. **Stage 1 – Preparatory training (up to 2015).** Up to 2015, single Services will maximise bilateral opportunities for liaison, staff training, exchanges and participation in planning events and tactical exercises to enhance understanding and cooperation.

¹ A proposed definition of *validation of concept* is: *The confirmation that a notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, has led to an accepted procedure meeting defined standards or criteria, through the provision of objective evidence.* This is based on the extant AAP-6 definitions of *validation* and *concept*.

² This would ideally be based on a Combined Joint Support Group (CJSG)

b. **Stage 2 – Initial validation of concept 2015.** Given the importance of command and control to the success of CJEF, there will be a command post exercise in 2015. This will focus primarily on ensuring that the right command structure at component level and above is in place, with the appropriate processes and control architecture to ensure success.

c. **Stage 3 – Final validation of concept 2016.** Declaration of a CJEF capability will follow a combined joint exercise in 2016. This will be a significant training evolution for both the UK and France. It will also be the key training event in that period. To fully validate the CJEF, the exercise will be built around a demanding crisis management scenario based upon a high intensity complex intervention.

504. The CJEF exercise programme will continue to develop over time. Some training opportunities are already planned. We will use these, as well as other NATO, EU and other multinational exercises, to address the CJEF objectives, minimising the requirement to instigate new events. Where these opportunities are not CJEF specific, we will agree CJEF related objectives bilaterally in order to assist CJEF development and promote interoperability.

LEXICON

PART 1 – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AJP (NATO)	Allied Joint Publication
CCT (CJEF)	Contingency Crisis Team
CCT (UK)	Current Commitments Team
CDS (UK)	Chief of Defence Staff
CEMA (FR)	Chef d'État Major des Armées (Chief of Defence Staff)
CIC (FR)	Centre Interministériel de crise/Interagency Crisis Centre
CICDE (FR)	Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrine et d'Expérimentations
CJEF (UK, FR)	Combined Joint Expeditionary Force
CJFAC	Combined Joint Force Air Component
CJFLC	Combined Joint Force Land Component
CJFMC	Combined Joint Force Maritime Component
CJO (UK)	Chief of Joint Operations
CJSG	Combined Joint Support Group
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COG (UK)	Current Operations Group
CONEMP	Concept of Employment
COPD (NATO)	Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
CPCO (FR)	Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (Strategic Operations Planning and Control Centre)
DCDC (UK)	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DCMO (UK)	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DFID (UK)	Department for International Development
DRM (FR)	Direction du Renseignement Militaire (Military Intelligence Directorate)
EMIA/FE (FR)	Etat-major interarmées de forces et d'entraînement

Lexicon

FCO (UK)	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FR	France
FST	Full Spectrum Targeting
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
LOA	Letter of Agreement
LOGCON	Logistics Control
LOI	Letter of Intent
MAEE (FR)	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes /Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
MOA	Measures of Activity
MOD (UK)	Ministry of Defence
MOE	Measures of Effects
MOP	Measures of Performance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC (UK)	National Security Council
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
PJHQ (UK)	Permanent Joint Headquarters
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOPCC (FR)	Strategic Operations Planning and Control Centre
SPG (UK)	Strategic Planning Group
UK	United Kingdom